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Abstract 
This paper constructs a theory of the coexistence of fixed-term and permanent 
employment contracts in an environment with ex-ante identical workers and employers. 
Workers under fixed-term contracts can be dismissed at no cost while permanent 
employees enjoy labor protection. In a labor market characterized by search and 
matching frictions, firms find it optimal to discriminate by offering some workers a fixed-
term contract while offering other workers a permanent contract. Match-specific quality 
between a worker and a firm determines the type of contract offered. We analytically 
characterize the firm’s hiring and firing rules. Using matched employer-employee data 
from Canada, we estimate the model’s parameters. Increasing the level of firing costs 
increases wage inequality and decreases the unemployment rate. The increase in 
inequality results from a larger fraction of temporary workers and not from an increase in 
the wage premium earned by permanent workers. 
JEL classification: H29, J23, J38 
Bank classification: Labour markets; Potential output; Productivity 
Résumé 
Les auteurs élaborent un cadre théorique pour expliquer la coexistence de contrats à 
durée déterminée et de contrats de travail permanents dans un milieu où travailleurs et 
employeurs sont a priori identiques. Les travailleurs temporaires sont licenciables sans 
frais, alors que les employés permanents jouissent d’une protection d’emploi. Sur un 
marché du travail caractérisé par des frictions dans la prospection et l’appariement, les 
entreprises jugent optimal d’opérer des distinctions en proposant à certains travailleurs un 
contrat à durée déterminée et à d’autres un contrat permanent. La qualité intrinsèque de 
l’appariement entre le travailleur et l’entreprise motive le choix du contrat offert. Les 
auteurs définissent par analyse les règles d’embauche et de congédiement des entreprises. 
Les paramètres du modèle sont estimés à l’aide de données canadiennes relatives au 
jumelage employeurs-salariés. La hausse des coûts de licenciement accroît l’inégalité des 
salaires et réduit le chômage. Cette montée de l’inégalité est causée par la présence d’une 
plus grande proportion de travailleurs temporaires et non par la majoration du surplus de 
rémunération octroyé aux travailleurs permanents. 
Classification JEL : H29, J23, J38 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés du travail; Production potentielle; Productivité 
 
 1 Introduction
The existence of two-tiered labor markets in which workers are segmented by the de-
gree of job protection they enjoy is typical in many OECD countries. Some workers,
which one could label temporary (or ﬁxed-term) workers, enjoy little or no protection.
They are paid relatively low wages, they experience high turnover, and they transit
among jobs at relatively high rates. Meanwhile, other workers enjoy positions where
at dismissal the employer faces a ﬁring tax or a statutory severance payment. These
workers’ jobs are more stable, they are less prone to being ﬁred, and they are paid
relatively higher wages. The menu and structure of available contracts is oftentimes
given by an institutional background who seeks some policy objective. Workers and
employers, however, can choose from that menu and agree on the type of relationship
they want to enter.
Thispaperexaminesthe conditions underwhich ﬁrms andworkers decidewhether
to enter a permanent or a temporary relationship. Intuitively ﬁrms should always opt
for offering workers the contract in which dismissal is free, not to have their hands
tied in case the worker under-performs. We construct a theory, however, in which
match-quality between a ﬁrm and a worker determines the type of contract chosen.
By match quality we refer to the component of a worker’s productivity that remains
ﬁxed as long as the ﬁrm and the worker do not separate and that is revealed at the time
they meet. Firms offer workers with low match-quality a ﬁxed-term contract, which
can be terminated at no cost after one period and features a relatively low wage. If
it is not terminated, the ﬁrm agrees to promote the worker and upgrade the contract
into a permanent one, which features a higher wage and it is relatively protected by
a ﬁring tax. On the other hand, facing the risk of losing a good worker, ﬁrms ﬁnd it
optimal to offer high-quality matches a permanent contract. The ﬁrm ties its hands
promising to pay the tax in case of termination and remunerating the worker with
a higher wage. This higher wage induces the worker not to incur in costly on-the-
job search. Endogenous destruction of matches, both permanent and temporary, arises
from changesin a time-varying component of a worker’s productivity: ifthese changes
are negative enough, they force ﬁrms to end relationships.
2Our set-up is tractable enough to allow us to characterize three cut-off rules. First,
we show that there exists a cut-off point in the distribution of match-speciﬁc shocks
above which the ﬁrm offers a permanent contract, and below which the ﬁrm offers a
temporary contract. There is also a cut-off point in the distribution of the time-varying
component of productivity below which the relationship between a temporary worker
and a ﬁrm ends and above which it continues. Finally, we show the existence of a cut-
off point also in the distribution of the time-varying component of productivity below
which the relationship between a permanent worker and a ﬁrm ends and above which
it continues.
Naturally, workers stay longer in jobs for which they constitute a good-match. Per-
manent workers enjoy stability and higher pay. Temporary workers on the other hand
experience high job-to-job transition rates in lower-paid jobs while they search for bet-
ter opportunities. We emphasize that our theory delivers all of these results endoge-
nously.
The paper does not examine the social or policy goals that lead some societies to
establish ﬁring costs or to regulate the relationships between workers and employers.
Rather, we build a framework in which the menu of possible contracts is given by an
institutional background that we do not model explicitly. We then use this framework
to evaluate under what conditions employers and workers enter into temporary or
permanent relationships. Not addressing the reasons for why governments introduce
ﬁring costs does not preclude us from making positive statements about the effects of
changing those ﬁring policies. This is precisely the goal of the second part of the paper:
to quantitatively evaluate how the existence of ﬁring costs helps shape the wage distri-
bution. To perform this quantitative evaluation, we apply the theory to the economy
of Canada. We choose to study the Canadian economy for three reasons. First, it has a
rich enough dataset that allows us to distinguish workers by type of contract. Second,
it is an economy with a signiﬁcant amount of temporary workers who represent 14%
of the total workforce. And third, Canada is one of the countries where the protection
of permanent workers is weakest and an economy with minimal regulations of tempo-
rary workers (see Venn (2009)). These facts suggest that our theory, which emphasizes
the choice of different contracts when match-quality differs, is perhaps more relevant
3for Canada than for other OECD countries (where ﬁrms and workers could have less
freedom in which contract to choose). We use the Workplace and Employee Survey
(WES), a matched employer-employee dataset, to link wages of workers to average
labor productivities of the ﬁrms that employ them. This relationship, together with
aggregate measures of turnover for permanent and temporary workers also obtained
from the WES, forms the basis of our structural estimation procedure. We employ
a simulated method of moments - indirect inference approach to structurally estimate
the parameters of the model. The method uses a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm
proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) that overcomes computational difﬁcul-
ties often encountered in simulation-based estimation.
Havingestimatedthevectorofstructural parameters, weperform twoexperiments.
In the ﬁrst experiment, we use the model to assess the impact of ﬁring costs on income
inequality. We ﬁnd that a 50% increase in the level of ﬁring costs increases the standard
deviation of the wage distribution by 20%. This rise in inequality is due entirely to the
increase in the fraction of temporary workers, which earn relatively lower wages. It
is not due to an increase in the “permanent worker premium”, the ratio of the wage
a permanent worker earns relative to that a temporary worker. The fraction of tem-
porary workers rises with ﬁring costs because their relative price drops; permanent
workers are more expensive since undoing a permanent match costs more. The wage
premium changes little because on the one hand, employers want to hire high pro-
ductivity permanent workers (to avoid having to hire them and pay the cost), but on
the other hand it is more costly to destroy existing matches, even when workers have
relatively low productivity. We also ﬁnd that an increase in the ﬁring costs lowers the
degree of turnover (it lowers both destruction and creation rates) but it decreases the
unemployment rate. The second experiment involves evaluating the welfare impact of
introducing temporary contracts, starting from an economy with ﬁring costs. Reforms
of that type were introduced in some European countries in the 1980s and 1990s.1 The
increase in welfare that results from such a policy change is caused by a decrease in
the unemployment rate; some workers that would otherwise be unemployed are now
employed as ﬁrms are more willing to post vacancies when temporary contracts are
1See Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2009) for an empirical evaluation of the Spanish reform.
4permitted.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature lacks a theory of the existence of two-
tiered labor markets in which some some worker-ﬁrm pairs begin relationships on a
temporary basis and other worker-ﬁrm pairs on a permanent basis.2 Again, by tem-
porary and permanent relationships we have something speciﬁc in mind; namely con-
tracts with different degrees of labor protection. Our study is not the ﬁrst one that
analyzes this question within a theoretical or quantitative framework, so by theory
we mean not assuming an ex-ante segmentation of a labor market into temporary
workers or permanent workers. This segmentation can occur for a variety of reasons:
related to technology (e.g. assuming that workers under different contracts are dif-
ferent factors in the production function); due to preferences - assuming that workers
value being under a permanent contract differently than being under a temporary con-
tract), or that they are subject to different market frictions. There are several examples
which feature such an assumption: Wasmer (1999), Alonso-Borrego, Galdón-Sánchez,
and Fernández-Villaverde (2006), or Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). Blanchard and
Landier (2002) take a slightly different route, associating temporary contracts with
entry-level positions: a worker begins a relationship with a ﬁrm in a job with a low
level of productivity. After some time, the worker reveals her true - perpetual - pro-
ductivity level.3 If such level is high enough, the ﬁrm will retain the worker offering
her a contract with job security.4 Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) construct a search and
matching framework to analyze the impact on several aggregates of changing ﬁring
costs. Their concept of temporary and permanent workers is similar to the one used
here. However, it is the government that determines randomly what contracts are per-
manent and which are temporary. In other words, the fraction of temporary worker
is itself a policy parameter. That model is unable to answer why these two contracts
2In the data, many workers that meet a ﬁrm for the ﬁrst time are hired under a permanent contract.
3Faccini (2009)also motivates the existence of temporary contracts as a screening device. In his work,
as in Blanchard and Landier, all relationships between workers and ﬁrms begin as temporary.
4A theory somewhat related to ours is due to Smith (2007). In a model with spatially segmented
labor markets, it is costly for ﬁrms to re-visit a market to hire workers. This leads ﬁrms to hire for short
periods of time if they expect the pool of workers to improve shortly and to hire for longer time periods
if the quality of workers currently in a market is high. He equates a commitment by a ﬁrm to never
revisit a market, as permanent duration employment. The route we take is to specify a set of contracts
that resemble arrangements observed in many economies and ask when do employers and workers
choose one arrangement over another.
5can co-exist in a world with ex-ante identical agents. The fraction of temporary work-
ers ought to be an endogenous outcome and this endogeneity should be a necessary
ingredient in any model that analyzes policies in dual labor markets.5
None of the studies mentioned in this summary of the literature is concerned with
building a theory that explains why ﬁrms and workers begin both temporary and
permanent relationships and analyzing policy changes once that framework has been
built. We build such a theory, estimate its parameters and analyze its policy implica-
tions for wage inequality and welfare in subsequent sections.
2 Economic Environment
We assume a labor market populated by a unit mass of ex-ante identical workers who
are endowed with one unit of time each period. These workers can be either employed
or unemployed as a result of being ﬁred and hired by a, potentially inﬁnite, mass of
ﬁrms. Workers search for jobs and each ﬁrm posts a vacancy with the hope of match-
ing to a worker. The number of meetings between employers and workers is given
by a matching technology that we specify below in detail. The main departure from
standard search and matching models of labor markets (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994))isour assumption that twotypes ofcontracts areavailable. Theﬁrst type, which
we label a permanent contract, has no predetermined length, but we maintain, how-
ever, the typical assumption of wage renegotiation at the beginning of each period.
Separating from this kind of contract is costly. If a ﬁrm and a worker under a perma-
nent contract separate, ﬁrms pay a ﬁring tax f that we assume is wasted. The second
type of contract, a temporary contract, has a predetermined length of one period. Once
that period is over, separating the match comes at no cost to the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm and
the worker decide to continue the relationship, the temporary contract is upgraded to
a permanent one. This upgrade, which one could label a promotion, costs the ﬁrm a
small fee c. Workers can incur d units of utility to search for a job regardless of their
5There is a related branch of the literature that looks at the effect of increasing ﬁring taxes on job cre-
ation, job destruction and productivity. An example is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). They ﬁnd large
welfare losses of labor protection policies as they interfere with labor reallocation from high productiv-
ity ﬁrms to low productivity ﬁrms. Other examples would be Bentolila and Bertola (1990) or Álvarez
and Veracierto (2000,2006).
6employment status. Unemployed workers receive beneﬁts b for as long as they are
unemployed, and the government ﬁnances this program by levying lump-sum taxes τ
on workers and unemployed agents.
The production technology is the same for the two types of contracts. If a ﬁrm hires
worker i, the match yields zi + yi,t units of output in period t. The random variable
z represents match-quality: a time-invariant, while the match lasts, component of a
worker’s productivity which is revealed at the time of the meeting. In our theory,
the degree of match-quality determines the type of contract agreed upon by the ﬁrm
and the worker. This match-speciﬁc shock is drawn from a distribution G(z). The
time-varying component yi,t is drawn every period from a distribution F(y) and it is
responsible for endogenous separations. From our notation, it should be clear to the
reader that both shocks are independent across agents and time. The supports of the
distributions of both types of shocks are given by [ymin,ymax] and [zmin,zmax] and we
will assume throughout that ymin < ymax − c − f.
A matching technology B(v, NS) determines the number of pairwise meetings be-
tween workers (NS) and employers (represented by the number of vacancies posted v).
This technology displays constant returns to scale and implies a job-ﬁnding probabil-
ity αw(θ) and a vacancy-ﬁlling probability αf(θ). which are both functions of the level
of market tightness θ. The job-ﬁnding and job-ﬁlling rates satisfy the following condi-
tions: αw′ (θ) > 0, αf′ (θ) < 0 and αw (θ) = θαf (θ). The tightness of the labor market
is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of vacancies to number of workers searching for
jobs. Every time a ﬁrm decides to post a vacancy, it must pay a cost k per vacancy
posted. Finally, if a ﬁrm and a worker meet, z is revealed and observed by both par-
ties. The realization of y, however, occurs after the worker and the ﬁrm have agreed
on a match and begun their relationship.
Let us ﬁrst ﬁx some additional notation:
• Q : Value of a vacancy.
• U : Value of being unemployed.
• VP : Value of being employed under a permanent contract.
7• VR : Value of being employed following promotion from a temporary position to
a permanent one.
• VT : Value of being employed under a temporary contract.
• JP : Value of a ﬁlled job under a permanent contract.
• JR : Value of a ﬁlled job that in the previous period was temporary and has been
converted to permanent.
• JT : Value of a ﬁlled job under a temporary contract.
It will be convenient to deﬁne by,
A ≡
 
z ∈ [zmin,zmax]|EyJP (y,z) ≥ EyJT (y,z)
 
the set of realizations of z for which the ﬁrm prefers to offer a permanent contract. For





1 z ∈ A,
0 z / ∈ A.






0 do not search.
2.1 Workers
We now proceed to describe the value of being unemployed or employed under differ-
ent contracts. The following equation states the value of being unemployed as the sum
of the ﬂow from home production (i.e., unemployment beneﬁts) net of search costs and
net of the lump-sum tax b − d − τ plus the discounted value of either being matched
to an un-ﬁlled job, which happens with probability αw(θ), or remaining unemployed.





IAEyVP (y,z) + (1− IA)EyVT (y,z)
 
dG(z), (1)
The value of being employed will depend on the type of contract agreed upon be-
tween the worker and the ﬁrm. In other words, the value of being employed under
a permanent contract differs from being employed under a temporary contract. We
begin by describing the evolution of VP, the value being employed under a permanent
contract, given by:








n is the value of not searching on-the-job, and VP
s is the value of searching
on-the-job. Each of those two values satisﬁes the following Bellman equations,
VP
n (y,z) = wP










s (y,z) = wP





IAEyVP (y, x) + (1− IA) EyVT (y, x)
 
dG (x)








If the worker ﬁnds it optimal not to search on the job, the ﬂow value of being em-
ployed under a permanent contract is a wage wP
n(y,z); the discounted continuation
value is the maximum of quitting and becoming unemployed, or remaining in the re-
lationship. As the match-speciﬁc shock is time-invariant, only changes in time-varying
productivity drive separations and changes in the wage. However, note that the ﬁring
decision occurs before production can even take place: the realization of y that deter-
mines the wage is not the realization of y that determines whether the relationship
continues or not. In the case the worker decides to search while employed, see equa-
tion (3), she needs to pay a search cost d. In that case, the discounted continuation
9value differs from the no-search case and has two components. The ﬁrst component
describes the continuation value if the on-the-job search is unsuccessful. With prob-
ability (1 − αw (θ)) the permanent worker does not ﬁnd a job and the two remaining
alternatives are obtaining a promotion and staying with the ﬁrm, or being dismissed
and becoming unemployed.6
The worker employed under a temporary contract also decides whether to search
on the job or not. When she searches, see equation (4) below, she earns wT
s (y,z) giving
up d units to ﬁnance her job search, which occurs at the end of the period. Again, the
job ﬁnding probability the worker faces is the same as that faced by the unemployed
and the permanent workers. Should the temporary worker not ﬁnd a job, she faces the
promotion decision after her new productivity level is revealed. She becomes unem-
ployed if her realization of y falls below a threshold to be deﬁned later. Formally,
VT
s (y,z) = wT
















If she does not search, the value of being a temporary worker is,
VT
n (y,z) = wT















Let us deﬁne VR, the value of working under a permanent contract for the ﬁrst
time; in other words, the value for a just-promoted worker. After earning a wage
wT (y,z) for one period, conditional on her time-varying productivity not being too
low, the temporary worker is “promoted”. This promotion costs the ﬁrm c and earns
the worker a larger salary wR(y,z). This salary is not at the level of wP(y,z), as the
6We assume that workers who search on the job forgo the opportunity to return to their current
employer if their job search is successful. By successful we mean that they ﬁnd any job at all, and not
necessarily a better job (a job with a higher z). While this assumption is un-realistic, due to random
matching the problem becomes intractable if we assume workers can meet with a new ﬁrm, not match,
and return to their current employer.
10ﬁrm has to face the cost c, but it is higher than wT(y,z). The worker earns this higher
salary for one period, and as long as she does not separate from the ﬁrm, she will earn
wP(y,z) in subsequent periods. Consequently, the value of a just-promoted worker
evolves as,
VR
n (y,z) = wR








if the worker does not search, or
VR
s (y,z) = wR





IAEyVP (y, x) + (1− IA) EyVT (y, x)
 
dG (x)
















We now turn to deﬁne some recursive relationships that must hold between asset val-
ues of vacant jobs and ﬁlled jobs under different employment contracts. Let us begin
by describing the law of motion for the asset value of a vacancy:













This equation simplystates that the valueof a vacantposition isthe expectedpayoff
from that vacancy net of posting costs k. Both workers and ﬁrms discount expected
payoffs with a factor β. With probability αf(θ), the vacant position gets matched to a
worker. This vacancy can be turned into either a permanent job, or a temporary job,
depending on the realization of the match-speciﬁc shock z. With probability 1 − αf(θ)
11the vacant position meets no worker and the continuation value for the ﬁrm is having
that position vacant.
Regarding capital values of ﬁlled positions, the ﬂow proﬁt for a ﬁrm is given by the
total productivity of the worker, y + z, net of the wage paid. And in the case of the
just-promoted worker, net also of the promotion cost c. Those capital values are given
by,
JP
s (y,z) = y + z − wP





























Analogously, asset values of ﬁlled jobs when workers are not searching are given by
JP
n (y,z) = y + z − wP









n (y,z) = y + z − wR









n (y,z) = y + z − wT








After taking into account search decisions by workers summarized by the policy func-
tion a, the capital values of ﬁlled positions are then given by
Ji (y,z) = aJi
s (y,z) + (1− a) Ji
n (y,z),
for i ∈ {P, R,T}.
123 Equilibrium
Tocharacterize theequilibrium, weﬁrstconjecture thatthere existsaninterval [dmin,dmax]
for d such that workers under permanent contracts decide not to search but workers
under temporary contracts decide to search. Then given any d ∈ [dmin,dmax] and the
worker’s optimal search decision under different types of contract, we determine the
hiring and ﬁring rules. These are summarized below in Propositions 1 and 2. In par-
ticular, we show that there exists a cut-off point ¯ z in the distribution of match-speciﬁc
quality that determines the type of contract chosen. In other words, values of match
quality below ¯ z will yield temporary contracts and values of match quality above ¯ z
will yield permanent contracts. We also derive the ﬁring rules which take the form of
cut-off points yP(z) and yR(z) in the time-varying component of productivity. Draws
of productivity below those two cut-off points destroy permanent and temporary re-
lationships respectively. After having derived these hiring and ﬁring rules, we show
that there exists an interval [dmin,dmax] for d such that no worker has an incentive to
deviate from the conjectured search decisions. In other words, for any value of d in-
side that interval, permanent workers never choose to search and temporary workers
always choose to search. This is shown by Proposition 3.
It will be convenient to re-write the value of a vacancy, using the deﬁnition of IA,
as,









1 − αf (θ)
 
Q. (15)
So far we have been silent about wage determination. Following much of the
search andmatching literature weassume thatupon meeting, ﬁrmsandworkers Nash-
bargain over the total surplus of the match. Clearly, the sizes of the surpluses will vary
depending on whether the worker and the ﬁrm agree on a temporary contract or a
permanent contract. We assume that workers and ﬁrms compute the sizes of the dif-
ferent surpluses and choose the largest one as long as it is positive. Since we have three
13different value functions for workers and ﬁrms, we have three different surpluses de-
pending on the choices faced by employers and workers.
Denoting by φ the bargaining power of workers, the corresponding total surpluses
for each type of contract are given by:
SP (y,z) = JP (y,z) − (Q − f) + VP (y,z) −U,
SR (y,z) = JR (y,z) − Q + VR (y,z) − U,
ST (y,z) = JT (y,z) − Q + VT (y,z) − U.
As a result of the bargaining assumption, surpluses satisfy the following splitting
rules:
SP (y,z) =
JP (y,z) − Q + f
1 − φ
=




JR (y,z) − Q
1− φ
=




JT (y,z) − Q
1− φ
=
VT (y,z) − U
φ
.
Free entry of ﬁrms takes place until any rents associated with vacancy creation are
exhausted, which in turn implies an equilibrium value of a vacancy Q equal to zero.
Replacing Q with its equilibrium value of zero in equation (15) results in the free-entry
condition:




IAEyJP (y,z) + (1− IA)EyJT (y,z)
 
dG (z)
The interpretation of this equation is that ﬁrms expect a per-vacancy-return equal
to the right-hand-side of the expression to justify paying k. Using the surplus sharing




IAEySP (y,z) + (1− IA) EyST (y,z)
 
dG(z) =
k + βαf (θ) G (A) f
(1− φ) βαf (θ)
, (17)
14where  G (A) is the probability measure of A. Equation (17) states that the expected
surplus, before ﬁrms and workers meet, is equal to the sum of two components. The
ﬁrst component, given by k
(1−φ)βαf(θ), is the expected value of a ﬁlled job divided by
(1 − φ). This is another way of rewriting the surplus in a model with no ﬁring costs
and obtains in other models of search and matching in labor markets. The introduc-
tion of ﬁring costs implies the total surplus needs to include the second component,
k+βαf(θ) G(A)f
(1−φ)βαf(θ) . This is the “compensation” to the ﬁrm for hiring a permanent worker,
which occurs with probability αf(θ) G(A), and having to pay the ﬁring cost f. Using
this relationship together with equation (16) to substitute into equation (1), one can





b − d − τ +
φαw (θ)
 





The valueofunemploymentcan bedecomposed into twocomponents: aﬂowvalue
represented by b − d − τ and an option value represented by the large fraction on the
right-hand-side. Closer inspection facilitates the interpretation of that option value.
Note that the expected surplus given by equation (17) equals this option value divided
by φαw(θ). The worker, by being unemployed and searching, has the chance of ﬁnding
a job, which happens with probability αw(θ), and obtaining a share φ of the expected
surplus of that match.
Suppose that, for any d ∈ [dmin,dmax], the permanent worker does not search on
the job while the temporary worker does. Given this conjecture, substituting equation
(18) into equations (2), (4), (6), (11), (12) and (13) and using (16), yields the following
convenient form of rewriting the surpluses under different contracts.







dF (x) + (1− β) f
−(b − d) −
φαw (θ)
 











dF (x) − c − βf
−(b − d) −
φαw (θ)
 












We begin by deriving the ﬁring rules, by which we mean two threshold produc-
tivity values yP(z) and yR(z). These represent the lowest draws of time-varying pro-
ductivity that imply continuing permanent (yP(z)) or temporary (yR(z)) relationships.
Proposition 1 shows the existence of these values of y, conditional on the type of con-
tract and the speciﬁc quality of the match, such that the relationship between a worker
and a ﬁrm ends. Before stating that proposition we assume the following:
Assumption 1 Suppose θ is bounded and belongs to [θmin,θmax], i.e., 0 ≤ αw (θmin) <
αw (θmax) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ αf (θmax) < αf (θmin) ≤ 1. The following inequalities hold for
exogenous parameters:
ymax + zmin ≥ b − dmin +
φ
1− φ
(θmaxk + βαw (θmax) f) − (1− β) f, (22)
b − dmax +
φ
1− φ




Assumption 2 In addition,
ymax + zmin − c − f ≥ b − dmin +
φ
1− φ
(θmaxk + βαw (θmax) f) − (1− β) f. (24)
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, for any d ∈ [dmin,dmax] and any z, there exists an
unique cut-off value yP (z) ∈ (ymin,ymax) and such that SP  
yP (z),z
 
= 0. If Assumption 2




16The cut-off values solve the following equations: 7
yP + z + β
  ymax
yP (1− F(x))dx = b − d − (1− β) f
+
φ(θk + βαw (θ) G (A) f)
(1− φ)
, (25)
yP + c + f = yR. (26)
Proposition 2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a cut-off point ¯ z above
which a ﬁrm and a worker begin a permanent relationship.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique cut-off value ¯ z ∈ [zmin,zmax] such that when z > ¯ z the










(y1|zmin,θmin, G = 0) ≡ d2
where
y1 ≡ b −
1
1− φ
f − zmin, (27)
y2 ≡
b − 1
1−φ f − zmax
−β(1 − αw (θmin))
  ymax




yP −1 is the inverse function of yP deﬁned in (25).
Having derived the ﬁring and hiring rules, we now proceed to show the existence
of an interval [dmin,dmax] for d such that no worker has an incentive to deviate from
the assumed search policies. In other words, permanent workers have no incentive to
search and temporary workers have the incentive to search. The following proposition
establishes the existence of this interval.
Proposition 3 Given the hiring and ﬁring rules described above, there exists an interval
[dmin,dmax] for the search cost parameter d such that workers under a permanent contract
have no incentive to search while workers under a temporary contract search on the job.
7Proofs for all propositions stated in the main body of the paper are relegated to an Appendix.
17The existence of the interval deﬁned in Proposition 3 should be intuitive to the reader.
If on-the-job search is too costly no employed worker would search irrespective of the
type of contract. Likewise, if search costs little all workers might opt to seek alternative
employment opportunities. However, it is also intuitive that for a given value of d, on-
the-job search is more costly for workers under high-quality matches. The reason is
that the “return” of searching on the job is lower for those high match-quality workers.
These are precisely the workers hired under permanent contracts, and as a result there
is a region for the on-the-job search cost d such that permanent workers do not search
but temporary workers do.
Toobtain expressions forwagespaidunderdifferentcontracts wecan substitute the
value functions of workers and ﬁrms into the surplus sharing rule (16), which gives:
wP (y,z) = φ(y + z) + (1− φ)(b − d)
+φ
 




k + βαf (θ) G (A) f
  
, (29)
wR (y,z) = wP (y,z) − φ(c + f), (30)
wT (y,z) = φ(y + z) + (1− φ)b. (31)
Finally, we need to explicitly state how the stock of employment evolves over time.
Let ut denote the measure of unemployment, and nP
t and nT
t be the measure of perma-
nent workers and temporary workers. Let’s begin by deriving the law of motion of the
stock of permanent workers, which is given by the sum of three groups of workers.
First, unemployed workers and temporary workers can search and match with other
ﬁrms and become permanent workers. This happens with probability αw (θt) G (A).









Third, some of temporary workers who cannot ﬁnd other jobs get promoted to perma-
nent workers which adds to the aggregate employment pool for permanent workers
by (1− αw (θt))






t . Notice that  G (A) = 1 − G(¯ z) and





























Unemployed workers and temporary workers who are unable to ﬁnd high-quality
matches, join the temporary worker pool the following period. Therefore the tem-







αw (θt)G(¯ z). (33)
Since the aggregate population is normalized to unity, the mass of unemployed work-
ers is given by:
ut = 1 − nT
t − nP
t .
The standard deﬁnition of market tightness is slightly modiﬁed to account for the on-






4 Partial Equilibrium Analysis
To understand the intuition behind some of the results we show in the quantitative sec-
tion, we perform here some comparative statics in “partial” equilibrium, by which we
mean keeping θ constant. The goal is to understand how changes in selected variables
impact the hiring and ﬁring decisions.
Proposition 4 The hiring rule has the following properties:





d¯ z/dαw < 0 when φ < ¯ φ
d¯ z/dαw > 0 when φ > ¯ φ
,
193. d¯ z/dc < 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 can be illustrated in Figures 1 to 3 . Figure 1
shows the effects of an increase in the ﬁring cost f. This increase has two effects on the
(net) value of a ﬁlled job.8 The direct effect causes a drop in the value of a permanent
job because the ﬁrm has to pay more to separate from the worker. As a result the
permanent contract curve shifts downward. An increase in f also increases the job
destruction rate of temporary workers by raising the threshold value ¯ yR, lowering the
value of a temporary job. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst effect dominates resulting in fewer
permanent contracts.
Increasing the job ﬁnding probability has an ambiguous effect on the hiring deci-
sion because it depends on the worker’s bargaining power. If it is easier for unem-
ployed workers to ﬁnd a job, the value of being unemployed increases because the
unemployment spell is shortened. This lowers the match surplus since the worker’s
outside option rises. Therefore, the value of ﬁlled jobs falls and (both permanent and
temporary) contract curves shifts outward. We call this the unemployment effect. How-
ever, there are two additional effects on temporary jobs. Since the temporary worker
searches on-the-job, the higher job ﬁnding probability increases the chance that a tem-
porary worker remains employed. Therefore, the match surplus rises due to the in-
crease in the value of temporary employment. We call this effect the job continuation
effect. For workers under temporary contract, these two effects exactly cancel out. On
the other hand, the higher job ﬁnding probability causes more separations of tempo-
rary contracts. This so-called job turnover effect reduces the value of a temporary job
which moves the temporary contract curve outward. If a worker has more bargain-
ing power, then the unemployment effect dominates the job turnover effect. This case
is depicted in Figure 1. However if the worker’s bargaining power is small, the job
turnover effect dominates the unemployment effect which leads to fewer temporary
workers. The latter case is shown in Figure 2.
8The size of the surplus determines the type of contract chosen or whether matches continue or
are destroyed. By Nash bargaining the value of a ﬁlled job is proportional to the total surplus, so it
is sufﬁcient to compare the changes in the values of ﬁlled jobs to determine the effects on the total
surpluses.
20Finally, the effect of an increase in promotion costs is depicted in Figure 3. As
promotion costs affect only the value of a temporary contract, an increase in c reduces
the incentive for promoting a temporary worker. As a result, the value of a temporary
job decreases and the temporary contract curve shifts downward.










Figure 1: Effect of Changing the Firing Costs on Temporary Contracts
Proposition 5 If the ﬁrm has most of the bargaining power, the job destruction rule has the
following properties:
1. dyP/df < 0 and dyR/df > 0,
2. dyP/dαw > 0 and dyR/dαw > 0.
3. yP is weakly increasing in c and dyR/dc > 0.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 5 states that the ﬁring cost has opposite effects on the
separation of permanent jobs and temporary jobs. An increase in the ﬁring cost de-
creases the ﬁrm’s willingness to pay the cost to ﬁre a permanent worker. However, it
increases its willingness to separate from a temporary worker now, in order to avoid
paying the higher ﬁring cost in the future. The second part of the proposition results










Figure 2: Effects of Changing the Job-Finding Probability on Temporary Contracts







Figure 3: Effects of Changing the Promotion Costs on Temporary Contracts
mainly from a change in the hiring threshold. The last part is straightforward: an
increase in promotion costs discourages the ﬁrm to retain the temporary worker.
Finally, we can take the hiring and ﬁring decisions as given and ask how changes
in the ﬁring cost and promotion cost affect the job creation (vacancy posting) decision.
22The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 6 Given the hiring and permanent job destruction rules, i.e. ¯ z and yP (z) are
ﬁxed, dθ/df < 0 if β is not too small and dθ/dc < 0.
The explanation of this proposition is that an increase in ﬁring costs and promotion
costs discourages the ﬁrm to post more vacancies by reducing the expected proﬁts of
jobs.
5 Data
To quantitatively explore the model, we use the Workplace and Employee Survey, a
Canadian matched employer-employee dataset collected by Statistics Canada. It is
an annual, longitudinal survey at the establishment level, targeting establishments in
Canada that have paid employees in March, with the exceptions of those operating in
the crop and animal production; ﬁshing, hunting and trapping; households’, religious
organizations, and the government sectors. In 1999, it consisted of a sample of 6,322
establishments drawn from the Business Register maintained by Statistics Canada and
the sample has been followed ever since. Every odd year the sample has been aug-
mented with newborn establishments that have become part of the Business Register.
The data are rich enough to allow us to distinguish employees by the type of contract
they hold. However, only a sample of employees is surveyed from each establishment.
9 The average number of employees in the sample is roughly 20,000 each year. Work-
ers are followed for two years and provide responses on hours worked, earnings, job
history, education, and demographic information. Firms provide information about
hiring conditions of different workers, payroll and other compensation, vacancies, and
separation of workers.
Given the theory laid out above, it is important that the deﬁnition of temporary
worker in the data matches as close as possible the concept of a temporary worker in
the model. In principle, it is unclear that all establishments share the idea of what a
temporary worker is when they respond to the survey: it could be a seasonal worker, a
9All establishments with less than four employees are surveyed. In larger establishments, a sample
of workers is surveyed, with a maximum of 24 employees per given establishment.
23ﬁxed-term consultant hired for a project or a worker working under a contract with a
set termination date. As a result, Statistics Canada implemented some methodological
changes to be consistent in its deﬁnition of a temporary worker. This affected the in-
cidence of temporary employment in the survey forcing us to use data only from 2001
onwards. The deﬁnition of temporary workers we use, it is of those receiving a T-4 slip
from an employer but who have a set termination date. For instance, workers from
temporary employment agents or other independent contractors are not included in
our deﬁnition. With the use of this deﬁnition the fraction of temporary workers among
all workers is 14%.10
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics on workers’ compensation by type of
contract held. All quantities are in Canadian dollars and we use three different mea-
sures of compensation: total earnings reported by the employee, hourly wages with
reported extra-earnings, and hourly wages without the reported extra earnings. Ac-
cording to the three measures, permanent workers earn more but they do work more
as well. As a result, while total earnings of permanent workers are roughly double
of those earned by temporary workers, when converted to hourly measures, that ra-
tio drops to 1.14-1.15. The cross-sectional distribution of wages per hour has a larger
variance in the case of temporary workers than of permanent workers. The standard
deviation of permanent workers’ hourly wages is about half of mean hourly wages.
This ratio rises to 81% for temporary workers.
In Canada, job turnover is higher for temporary workers than for permanent work-
ers, as extensively documented by Cao and Leung (2010). We reproduce some of their
turnover statistics in Table 2. As it is typical, we measure turnover by comparing job
creation and job destruction rates. If we denote by EMPt,i the total level of employ-
ment at time t at establishment i, the creation and destruction rates between periods t






10There is temporary employment in all demographic groups, though younger workers are more
likely to hold a temporary job. Our model is consistent with this data fact by allowing for the promotion
of a temporary worker who can be a young worker.
24Table 1: Worker’s Compensation by Type of Contract
Mean Standard Deviation
Permanent
Real Earnings $21,847 $33,525
Real Hourly Wage (No Extra) $21.43 $11.75
Real Hourly Wage $22.57 $14.40
Temporary
Real Earnings $9,737 $26,469
Real Hourly Wage (No Extra) $18.87 $15.22
Real Hourly Wage $19.54 $18.85






if Empt+1,i − Empt,i < 0 and 0 otherwise.
Given the emphasis of our work on a labor market segmented by temporary and
permanent workers, we use the previous expressions to provide measures of job de-
struction and creation by the type of contract held. However, we measure creation and
destruction of temporary (or permanent) workers relative to the average total employ-
ment level. In other words, we measure the change in the stock of workers by contract
type relative to the stock of total employment. These rates are given on the ﬁrst two
lines of Table 2. The job destruction rates are 6.4% for permanent workers and 6.2% for
temporary workers. The creation rates are 8.1% and 5.3%. As the fraction of tempo-
rary workers is only 14% of the workforce, these rates point to a much higher degree
of turnover for temporary workers.
25Table 2: Job Creation and Job Destruction (%)
Conventional Deﬁnition
All Workers Permanent Temporary
Job Creation 10.2 8.1 5.3
Job Destruction 9.2 6.4 6.2
Alternative Deﬁnition
All Workers Permanent Temporary
Job Creation 8.2 5.1 3.1
Job Destruction 7.1 4.1 3.0
The reader might have noticed that the sum of the destruction rates for temporary
and permanent workers is not equal to the destruction rate for all workers. The same
can be said for the creation rate. The reason is that establishments can change the
numberoftemporaryandpermanentworkers withoutalteringthestock ofallworkers.
If we restrict the sample to those establishments that increase or decrease the stock of
both permanent and temporary workers, the rates for all workers are the sum of the
rates of the two types of workers. These measures are reported in Table 2 under the
“Alternative Deﬁnition” label. Turnover decreases under this alternative deﬁnition,
with creation and destruction rates for all workers that are 2% lower than using the
conventional deﬁnition. The total job creation rate is 8.2% and the job destruction rate
is 7.1%.
6 Model Estimation
Our goal is to use our theory to understand patterns of inequality as they relate to em-
ployment contracts. More speciﬁcally, we want to assess how changes in ﬁring policies
affect inequality in wages and this goal demands our theory to be parameterized in a
reasonable manner. This section describes the mapping between theory and data, goes
over some technicalities of this mapping and shows its results.
26Obtaining a solution for the model requires specifying parametric distributions for
G(z) and F(y).11 We assume that y is drawn from a normal distribution and z from a
uniform distribution. In the model the overall scale of the economy is indeterminate
and shifts in the mean of y plus z have no impact. Consequently, we normalize the
mean of y plus z to one, reducing the dimension of the parameter vector of interest.
One needs a functional form for the matching technology as well. Denote by B the
level of matches given vacancies v and searching workers NS = nT + u. Note that
we have already excluded the mass of permanent workers from the pool of search-
ing workers. Given that our data set does not provide information about on the job
behavior (or job-to-job transitions), we ﬁx d to a value of zero and check whether the
sufﬁcient conditions of Proposition 3 hold. With this ﬁxed value for d we estimate the
remaining parameters of interest. We give more detail a few paragraphs below on how























Having speciﬁed parametric forms for G, F, and the matching technology we are
now ready to describe our procedure in detail. Let γ = (f,b,φ,ξ,k, y,σz,σy) be the
vector of structural parameters we need to estimate where  x and σx denote the mean
and the standard deviation for a random variable x.12 The literature estimating search
11The reader can ﬁnd much technical detail about our solution and estimation algorithms in a Techni-
cal Appendix
12Parameters c, β, and  z, should in principle be included in the vector γ. We ﬁx β to be 0.96 and c to
be 1%of the ﬁring cost f. The standarddeviation of z is given by the normalization that E(y)+E(z) = 1.
27models is large and much of it has followed full-information estimation methodolo-
gies, maximizing a likelihood function of histories of workers.13 These workers face
exogenous arrival rates of job offers (both on and off-the-job) and choose to accept or
reject such offers. Parameters maximize the likelihood of observing workers’ histories
conditional on the model’s decision rules. In this paper, we depart from this literature
by choosing a partial information approach to estimating our model. Our reason is
twofold. First, our search model is an equilibrium one; the arrival rates of job offers
are the result of aggregate behavior from the part of consumers and ﬁrms. Second, the
lack of a panel dimension of the WES does not allow us to perform a maximum like-
lihood estimation. For these reasons, we take a partial-information route and estimate
the model by combining indirect inference and simulated method of moments.
Theﬁrst stepinvolveschoosing asetofempiricalmoments; setofdimensionatleast
as large as the parameter vector of interest. We estimate the parameters by minimizing
a quadratic function of the deviations of those empirical moments from their model-
simulated counterparts. Formally,
ˆ γ = argmin
γ
M(γ,YT)′W(γ,YT)M(γ,YT) (36)
where ˆ γ denotes the point estimate for γ, W is a weighting matrix, and M is a
column vector whose k-th element denotes a deviation of an empirical moment and a
model-simulated moment. The vector YT describes time series data - of length T - from
which we compute the empirical moments. The above expression should be familiar
to readers, as it is a standard statistical criterion function in the method-of-moments or
GMM literatures. Traditional estimation techniques rely on minimizing the criterion
function (36) and using the Hessian matrix evaluated at the minimized value to com-
pute standard errors. In many instances equation (36) is non-smooth, locally ﬂat, and
have several local minima. For these reasons, we use the quasi-Bayesian Laplace Type
Estimator (LTE) proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). They show that un-
der some technical assumptions, a transformation of (36) is a proper density function
13The list is far from being exhaustive but it includes Cahuc et al. (2006), Finn and Mabli (2009),
Bontemps et al. (1999), Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). The reader is referred to Eckstein and Van den Berg
(2007) for a survey of the literature that includes many more examples.
28(in their language, a quasi-posterior density function) As a result, they show how mo-
ments of interest can be computed using using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
techniques by sampling from that quasi-posterior density. We describe our estimation
technique in more detail in the technical appendix, but MCMC essentially amounts to
constructing a Markov chain that converges to the density function implied by a trans-
formation of (36). Draws from that Markov Chain are draws from the quasi-posterior,
and as a result, moments of the parameter vector such as means, standard deviations,
or othe quantities of interest are readily available. An important aspect of the estima-
tion procedure is the choice of the weighting matrix W. We post-pone a description
of how we weight the different moments and we now turn to describe the moments
themselves.
Indirectinference involvespositing anauxiliary-reduced-form -modelwhich links
actual data and model-simulated data. Given our focus on wage inequality, the aux-
iliary model we choose is a wage regression that links wages, productivity, and the
type of contract held. Before being more speciﬁc about this regression let us ﬁrst dis-
cuss an identiﬁcation assumption needed to estimate it. An important element in our
model’s solution are wages by type of contract which are given by equations (29)-
(31). Irrespective of the type of contract wages are always a function of a worker’s
productivity y + z. In the data, such productivity is unobserved; one observes an es-
tablishment’s total productivity or the productivity for the entire sample. To overcome
this difﬁculty we assume that the time-varying component of productivity y is ﬁrm
or establishment-speciﬁc. Consequently, differences among workers’ wages within a
ﬁrm will be the result of working under a different contract or of having a different
match-speciﬁc quality. We then posit that the (log) wage of worker i of ﬁrm j at time t
is given by:
log(wijt) = β + βALPlog(ALPjt) + βTypeχijt + ǫijt (37)
where ALPjt is an establishment’s average labor productivity - output divided by
total hours - and χijt is an indicator variable describing a worker’s temporary status.
This is the equation we estimate from the data.14 A panel of values for ALPjt is easy to
14We take logarithms for wages and ALPjt as our model is stationary and displays no productivity
29obtain, as we have observations on the number of workers and the amount of output
per establishment. Note that variations over time in ALPjt arise from changes in the
time-varying productivity shock but also from the matches and separations that occur
within a establishment over time. If as a result of turnover within a establishment, the
mix of workers changes- there are more temporary workers in some year, for instance-
the average worker productivity will change, even without a change in yjt. Let us now
describe what is the analogous equation to (37) we estimate in our model-simulated
data. Our theory is silent about ﬁrms or establishments; there are only matches of
which one can reasonably speak. Note, however, that ALPjt is the sum of the time-
varying component yjt plus an expectation of the match-speciﬁc productivity z at time
t - assuming a large number of workers per establishment. Hence, we simulate a large
number of values of y, z, and wages by contract type and regress the logarithm of
wages on a constant, the logarithm of the sum of y and the mean simulated z and the
contract type. Disturbances in this regression will be interpreted as deviations of the
match-speciﬁc quality for a given match relative to its mean match-speciﬁc value (plus
some small degree of simulation error).
Our sample ofthe WESdata-set covers the years 2001to 2006. Weestimate equation
(37) for each year which yields a series of estimates (β, βALP, βType,σǫ). Returning to
our criterion function (36), the ﬁrst two moments we choose to match are the time-
series averages of the coefﬁcients βALP and βType. Table 3 summarizes the vector of all
moments (a total of 13), which includes time-series averages of job-creation and job-
destruction (for all workers, JD and JC; and for permanent and temporary workers,
JCP, JDP, JCT, and JDT)15, the fraction of temporary workers ( nT
1−u), the job-ﬁnding
probability (αw), and the ratio of wages of permanent workers to those of temporary
workers (wP
wT), the unemployment rate (u), and the average of the fraction of the ﬁring
costs relative to the wage of a permanent worker (
f
wP).16
The deviations of the empirical averages from their model counterparts comprise
thevector M. Following much ofthe GMMliterature, weweightelementsof M accord-
growth.
15We follow the “Conventional Deﬁnition” (see Table 2) for computing these destruction and creation
rates. In the Appendix the reader will ﬁnd detailed expressions that show how we calculate them.
16We thank M. Zhang for sharing her data on the Canadian job-ﬁnding rate used in Zhang (2008).
















ing to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the deviations of the time series shown
in Table 3 from their model equivalents.
7 Results
Table 4 shows the estimated parameter values along with their standard errors. The
point estimates are the quasi-posterior means and the standard errors are the quasi-
posterior standard deviations.17 We estimate a bargaining power of workers φ equal
to 0.62. This value is about the same magnitude as those that are calibrated, but larger
than previously estimated values such as Cahuc et al.’s (2006), which is very close to
zero. The estimation yields distributions for y and z whose means are far apart. Recall
that E(y) + E(z) = 1 but E(y) is larger than 4. The theory imposes several restrictions
on the parameter vector beyond the usual ones (e.g. φ ∈ (0,1)). In particular, we
impose the restrictions over the parameter space described in Assumptions 1 and 2,
and also those sufﬁcient restrictions for the results we present in Proposition 2 to be
17These results are based on 4,000 draws of the Markov chain.








 y 4.160 0.012
σy 0.717 0.006
valid. It is not possible, however, to satisfy the restrictions described in the proof for
Proposition 3, that are sufﬁcient to establish the existence of the interval [dmin,dmax]
such that permanent workers do not search and temporary workers do.18
These estimated parameters imply moments that we report on the ﬁrst column of
Table 5.19 The second column of the table reports the equivalent empirical moments.
The ﬁt is satisfactory and only one moment is signiﬁcantly off its empirical value: the
fraction of temporary workers. The readershould bearin mind that the fraction oftem-
porary workers from the workers’ survey is smaller than the number reported in the
establishment survey. In the latter the number is the 14% we use asthe actual empirical
value, but in the workers’ survey the number is much smaller; about 5%. The unem-
ployment rate is perhaps another moment in which the model does not give a good ﬁt.
It is somewhat difﬁcult to get it to be below 10%. All in all, we ﬁnd these results re-
markable for two reasons. First, because of how parsimonious and stylized our theory
is. Two, because we are imposing tight restrictions on the parameter space, restrictions
that are present in the theory but that one could relax by means of measurement error
or stochastic disturbances of a different nature. We choose not to, and except for the re-
striction on the on-the-job search policies, the theory seems to be consistent with those
restrictions by providing a good ﬁt.
18We were unable to satisfy those restrictions even for values of d larger than zero. The results shown
correspond to the case d = 0.
19We performed an alternative estimation restricting our data to ﬁrms that were in the sample for
the entire time (in other words, a balanced panel of ﬁrms). Parameters estimated with this alternative
dataset were similar to estimates shown here. These alternative results are available upon request.
327.1 Firing Costs and Wage Inequality
We perform the experiment of increasing ﬁring costs by 50% from the estimated value
of f = 0.185. Table 6 reports the result from this experiment. The ﬁrst and the last
column of that table show the same numbers as Table 5. The middle column shows the
results for the economy with the 50% increase in the level of ﬁring costs. Increasing f
has a modest effect in all moments except obviously the share of wages that the ﬁrm
has to pays as a ﬁring tax.
As intuition would suggest, creation and destruction of permanent matches drop.
The function YP(z) shifts downward (i.e. falls for every value of z) but the shift is
more pronounced for higher values of z. The creation rate of permanent jobs drops by
about 30% and the destruction rate by a bit less. 20 Since the majority of workers are
employed under permanent contracts, when aggregating across both types of workers
creation and destruction rates fall. However, the destruction rate falls less than the
creation rate, contributing to the rise in employment and the fall in the unemployment
rate. Not surprisingly, the rise in employment is entirely due to the rise in the number
of temporary workers, as they are relatively cheap. The destruction rate of temporary
workers rises because fewer of them obtain promotions. Perhaps surprisingly, the cre-
ation rate of temporary jobs falls. The explanation for this fall is clear once one recalls
the deﬁnition of that creation rate. It is given by αw(θ)(1 − G(¯ z))u/(nT + nP); on net,
the only way to create a temporary job is for an unemployed person to ﬁnd a tempo-
rary job. However, our convention is to compute these newly created jobs as a fraction
of total employment. The stock of employed people rises substantially, contributing to
the fall in the creation rate.
Increasing the level of f has no discernible effect on the wage premium permanent
workers earn. The rise in f, which increases that wage premium, is offset by other
factors, such as the drop in the job-ﬁnding probability, which decreases the premium.
On net, the ratio of permanent to temporary wages barely decreases.
20Given that YP(z) drops more for larger values of z, the increase in ﬁring costs is not large enough
to completely shift the YR(z) schedule. It turns out that the latter tilts clockwise. Recall that YR =
yP + f + c. If the drop in YP is large enough for large values of z, adding the new level of ﬁring costs
will not be enough to shift upwardsYR(z) above its previous value, for all values of z. The new value for
YR afterincreasing f by 50%is higher forlow valuesof z but lowerforhigher valuesof z. However,since
low values of z characterize temporary contracts the destruction rate of temporary workers increases.















Table 6: Effects of an Increase in Firing Costs (f)
f=0.185 f=1.5*0.185 Data
JD 0.102 0.077 0.092
JDP 0.102 0.076 0.064
JDT 0.040 0.047 0.062
JC 0.105 0.081 0.102
JCP 0.101 0.072 0.081
JCT 0.065 0.034 0.053
nT
nT+nP 0.062 0.098 0.140
α(θ) 0.922 0.899 0.919
f
w 0.182 0.274 0.182
β1 0.166 0.261 0.159
β2 0.207 0.126 0.193
u 0.103 0.083 0.071
wP
wT 1.139 1.136 1.140
34What are the implications of these changes for the shape of the wage distribution?
Figure 4 shows the wage distribution for the three casesdiscussed. The blue (solid) line
represents the density function of wages (using standard kernel-smoothing methods)
when the parameters are set to their quasi-posterior means. If we increase the level of
ﬁring costs by 50%, the result is the red (dashed-dotted) line: lower mean wages, be-
cause of the larger fraction of temporary workers, and considerably larger inequality.21






















Figure 4: Wage distributions for different levels of ﬁring costs.
7.2 The Welfare Implications of Temporary Contracts
We now provide some calculations of the changes in welfare that result from the intro-
duction of temporary contracts in economies where existing workers are protected by
ﬁring costs. We do so by performing the following computational experiment. Given
the estimated parameters above (the baseline case), we force ¯ z to drop to a level in
21Inequality measured using the standard deviation rises by 21% and the mean of wages falls by
roughly 6%.
35Table 7: Temporary Contracts: Welfare Evaluation
Model u θ W
Baseline 0.106 1.20 24.41
No Temp. 0.123 0.76 21.37
which the fraction of temporary workers is zero.22 The goal is to compare welfare
changes from the baseline economy to this second economy in which the fraction of












Note that in this expression we have equated the aggregate unemployment bene-
ﬁts payment bu to taxes levied τ. Hence, the welfare of unemployed agents does not
appear explicitly but it is taken into account. As the ﬁrst row, third column, of Table
7 shows, the welfare of the baseline economy of the baseline economy is 24.41. This
economy features an unemployment rate of 10.6% and an equilibrium value of θ of
1.20. When the value of ¯ z is forced to be equal to zmin, the welfare drops to a value
of 21.37, as the second row of the table indicates.23 This decrease of about 12% results
from the higher unemployment rate (12.3% vs. 10.6%), which in turn results from the
much lower level of vacancies posted by ﬁrms. This can be seen from the large drop in
θ (from 1.20 to 0.76).24
8 Concluding Remarks
This study provides a theory of the co-existence of labor contracts with different ﬁr-
ing conditions. Consistent with empirical evidence that points to employers choosing
among contracts with different degrees of labor protection, ﬁrms here choose to offer
22We check that for these lower levels of ¯ z workers and ﬁrms still want to match. That is, EySP(y, ¯ z) >
0.
23It is important to emphasize that we do not change any of the elements of the vector γ to achieve
¯ z = zmin.
24Indeed, the vacancy ﬁlling rate increases from 0.76 in the baseline case to 0.94 in the economy with
no temporary workers.
36ex-ante identical workers different contracts, and as a result, different wages. The rea-
son is match-quality that varies across worker-ﬁrm pairs and that is revealed at the
moment ﬁrms and workers meet. Firms offer permanent contracts to “good” matches,
as they risk losing the worker should they offer them a temporary contract. This risk
results from the different on-the-job search behavior by the two types of workers: in
equilibrium temporary workers search while permanent workers do not. Not-so-good
matches are given a temporary contract under which they work for a lower wage. Af-
ter one period, temporary workers have to be dismissed or promoted to permanent
status.
The existence of search and matching frictions implies that workers might work
temporarily in jobs with an inferior match quality, before transferring to better, and
more stable, matches. Our assumption of including a time-varying component in the
total productivity of a worker allows our environment to generate endogenous de-
struction rates that differ by type of contract. Our environment is simple enough to
deliver several analytical results regarding cut-off rules for the type of relationship
ﬁrms and workers begin and when and how they separate. Despite its simplicity, the
environment is rich in its implications.
One of these implications is that we can examine wage inequality from a different
perspective. To what extent do ﬁring costs help shape the wage distribution? We ﬁnd
that a substantial increase in inequality follows an increase in the level of ﬁring costs.
This rise in inequality is due entirely to the increase in the fraction of temporary work-
ers, which earn relatively lower wages. It is not due to an increase in the “permanent
worker premium”, the ratio of the wage a permanent worker earns relative to that a
temporary worker.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the role of minimal wage in shaping the
employment contract composition. Likely, the minimal wage may reduce the number
of temporary contracts and increase the unemployment. However, a thorough study
is left for future work.
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40A Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (19) can be written as
SP (y,z) = y + z + β
  ymax
yP SP (x,z)dF (x) + (1− β) f
−(b − d) −
φαw (θ)
 




From the fact that ∂SP/∂y = 1 and ∂2SP/∂y∂z = 0, it implies that SP (y,z) = y + ϕ(z).
The integral on the right-hand side of (39) is then
  ymax
yP SP (x,z)dF (x) =
  ymax
yP x + ϕ(z)dF(x),





For any z ∈ Z, SP  
yP,z
 
= 0 implies yP = −ϕ(z). Substitute ϕ(z) with −yP, the
expression of the integral is
  ymax
yP SP (x,z)dF(x) =
  ymax
yP [1− F(x)]dx. (40)
To pin down yP, we need to solve the equation SP (yp,z) = 0, thus
yP + z + β
  ymax




k + βαf (θ) G (A) f
 
(1− φ)αf (θ)




(θk + βαw (θ) G (A) f). (41)
Denote left-hand side by Φz (y) and right-hand side by Φ(θ,d). Notice that Φ(θ,d) is
increasing in θ and decreasing in d plus  G (A) ∈ [0,1], thus for any θ ∈ [θmin,θmax]
41and d ∈ [dmin,dmax],
b − dmax +
φ
1− φ
θmink − (1− β) f < Φ(θ,d)
< b − dmin +
φ
1− φ
(θmaxk + βαw (θmax) f) − (1− β) f.
Φz (y) is increasing in y and z. If inequalities (22) and (23) holds then for given θ, d and
z, we must have
Φz (ymin) ≤ Φzmax (ymin) < Φ(θ,d) < Φzmin (ymax) ≤ Φz (ymax).
We can conclude there is a unique solution yP (z) ∈ (ymin,ymax) for equation (41) by
the intermediate value theorem. That is, yP (z) exists for any z ∈ [zmin,zmax].
Similarly, equation (20) can be rewritten as
SR (y,z) = y + z + β
  ymax








Following the same argument for the condition SP  
yP,z
 
= 0, the above equation
yields the cut-off value by solving:
yR +z+β
  ymax
yP [1− F(x)]dx = b−d+
φαw (θ)
 




Comparing equations (41) and (43), we get
yR = yP + c + f.
Then assumption 2 guarantees the existence of yP ∈ (ymin,ymax − c − f) which implies
yR < ymax exists as well.
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. EyJP (y,z) and EyJT (y,z) are both strictly increasing
in z. From the surplus sharing rule, it is sufﬁcient to show that SP (y,z) and ST (y,z)
42are strictly increasing in z. Substitute equation (40) into (39), we obtain
SP (y,z) = y + z + β
  ymax
yP(z)


















From equation (41), the implicit function theorem implies that




Plug (46) into (45), we get ∂SP/∂z > 0. Similarly, the total surplus of a temporary
contract can be rewritten as




The derivative of ST with respect to z is given by
∂ST (y,z)
∂z






yP′ (z) > 0.
Step 2. EyJP (y,z) and EyJT (y,z) are strictly convex. By the separability of y and z,
it sufﬁces to prove that SP and STare convex in z. Twice differentiate SP with respect























yP   2 < 0 and F′ > 0, it must be the case that
∂2SP (y,z)/∂z2 > 0. Similarly, ∂2ST (y,z)/∂z2 > 0.
These two steps guarantee that if EyJP (y,z) = EyJT (y,z) holds, the cut-off value z
43is unique. The last step is to verify the single crossing property. That is, if
EyJP (y,zmin) < EyJT (y,zmin),
EyJP (y,zmax) > EyJT (y,zmax)
hold, then the cut-off value ¯ z exists. Denote
∆θ,d (z) =




yP [1− F(x)]dx − β(1− αw (θ))
  ymax



















The last equality is derived by replacing β
  ymax
yP [1− F(x)]dx with equation (41). No-





φ(k + β G fαw′ (θ))















∆θ,d (zmin) ≤ b −
1
1− φ
f − yP (zmin,θmin,0,d) − zmin, (48)
and
∆θ,d (zmax) ≥ b −
1
1− φ





44zmin ¯ z zmax
EyJP(y,z)
EyJT(y,z)
Figure 5: Permanent Contract vs. Temporary Contract
It is sufﬁcient to show that the RHS of (48) is less than 0 and the RHS of (49) is greater
than 0. This requires
y1 ≡ b −
1
1 − φ
f − zmin ≤ yP (zmin,θmin,0,d),
y2 ≡
b − 1







yP −1 the inverse mapping of y into d. Since yP is monotonically decreasing









Figure A shows the single crossing property.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is sufﬁcient to consider a permanent worker to search on-
the-job only for one period. Using (3) and (9) yields the total surplus for a permanent
45match of:
SP
s (y,z) = JP
s (y,z) − (Q − f) + VP
s (y,z) −U









Ifthe permanentworker does not search, the total surplus SP (y,z) isgiven byequation
(19). What we need to show is
SP(y,z) ≥ SP
s (y,z)





(θk + βαw (θ) G (A) f) − βαw (θ)
   ymax
yP [1 − F(x)]dx − f
 
. (51)




(θmaxk + βαw (θmax) f) − βαw (θmin)
   ymax
yP(zmin,θmax,1,dmin)
[1− F(x)]dx − f
 
.







1−φ (θmaxk + βαw (θmax) f)
−βαw (θmin)
   ymax






inequality (51) holds. Similar argument can show that the newly promoted worker
will have no incentive to search.
We now show that temporary workers have an incentive to search on the job. Sup-
pose temporary workers do not search for one period. Using (5) and (14) generates the
46surplus as:
ST













k + βαf (θ) G (A) f
 
(52)






(θk + βαw (θ) G (A) f) − βαw(θ)
  ymax
yR [1− F(x)]dx. (53)






[1 − F(x)]dx. (54)









temporary workers have an incentive to search on the job.
Combine conditions in Proposition 2, we have dmin = max(d1,d3) and dmax ≡
min(d2,d4).
Proof of Proposition 4. The equilibrium condition for ¯ z is EyJP (y, ¯ z) = EyJT (y, ¯ z). By
using the sharing rule (16) and equations (19) and (21), it implies that
β
  ymax







φ(θk + βαw (θ)(1− G(¯ z)) f)
(1− φ)
+ d − β(1− αw)
  ymax
¯ yR (1 − F(x))dx = 0 (55)
47where ¯ yP ≡ yP (¯ z) and ¯ yR ≡ yR (¯ z) = ¯ yP + c + f. From equation (25), we have
¯ yP + ¯ z + β
  ymax
¯ yP (1− F(x))dx + (1− β) f
− (b − d) −
φ(θk + βαw (θ)(1− G(¯ z)) f)
(1− φ)
= 0. (56)
Denote the left hand sides of equations (55) and (56) by Π
 
























































k + βαf (1− G(¯ z)) f
 
  ymax















¯ yR  
 
.
The determinant of matrix D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π is
   
 D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π
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   D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π
 















































Observe that the numerator (a1 + a2) is decreasing in φ. When φ = 0, the numerator
becomes
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k + βαf (1− G(¯ z)) f
  
.






¯ yP     ymax
¯ yR (1− F(x))dx >
0, while φ → 1, a3 → −∞. Therefore there exists ¯ φ such that
 
d¯ z
dαw < 0 when φ < ¯ φ
d¯ z














¯ yR  
 
   D(¯ yP,¯ z)Π
 
   
< 0.






1−φαwβ(1− G(¯ z)) +
φ
1−φαwβfG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
df












1−φαwβfG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
dαw






1−φαwβfG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
dc
1− β(1− F(¯ yP))
→ 0+.











(1− G(¯ z)) − fG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
df
 










1−φαwβfG′ (¯ z) d¯ z
dc
1− β(1− F(¯ yP))
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. The job creation rule is obtained by equation (17). Substitute
equations (19) and (21) into (17), we get
E(y + z) − b(1− d) −
  ¯ z
zmin
d(E(y) + z)dG(z) + (1− β)(1− G(¯ z)) f
−
β + φαw (θ)(1− G(¯ z))
(1− φ) βαf (θ)
 
k + βf (1− G(¯ z))αf (θ)
 
+ β(1− αw (θ))










(1 − F(x))dxdz = 0 (57)
Denote the left hand side of equation (57) by h and differentiate it with respect to θ, f





















due to αw′ (θ) > 0 and αf′ (θ) < 0,
∂h
∂f
= (1 − β)(1− G(¯ z)) −






































51B Model Solution and Estimation
This section describes some technical aspects of the solution and estimation algorithms
that produce the results shown in section 7. The model described can be deﬁned as a
function Ξ : Γ → ˜ Y, where γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Rnγ , and ˜ y ∈ ˜ Y ⊂ RnM. An element in the set
˜ Y can be thought of an endogenous variable (e.g. the unemployment rate) that is an
outcome of the model. The estimation procedure uses a statistical criterion function
that minimizes the deviations of model-implied moments - weighted appropriately -
from empirical moments.
Empirical momentsare given bythemeansoftimeseriesthathave amodel-implied







deﬁne the vector MnM×1 as having typical element mj = (˜ y(γ) − ¯ Y
j
T)




t=1 yt. We construct the statistical criterion func-
tion,
H(γ,YT) = M(γ,YT)′W(γ,YT)M(γ,YT) (58)
We sensibly choose the matrix W(γ,YT) to be the inverse of the variance matrix of
YT. In our application nM = 13 and nγ = 8, since the parameter vector of interest is
given by γ = (f,b,φ,ξ,k, y, z,σy). In principle one can obtain an estimate of γ by:
ˆ γ = argmin
γ
H(γ,YT).
Minimizing the function H(γ,YT) by means of standard minimization routines e.g.
any optimizer in the family of Newton-type methods, is seldom an easy task. Prob-
lems abound, and they include non-differentiabilities, ﬂat areas, and local minima. To
obtain estimates of γ we employ a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) that







where π(γ) is a prior distribution (or weight function) over the parameter space. This
distribution can be uniform which implies a constant π(γ) and we assume so in the
estimation. Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) label p(γ,YT) a quasi-posterior density
because it is not a posterior density function in a true Bayesian sense; there is no up-
dating. It is, however, a proper density function with well-deﬁned moments and as a





In practice, the way we compute the quasi-posterior mean is by a Monte Carlo
52procedure. Markov Chain Monte Carlo amounts to simulating a Markov Chain that
converges to the quasi-posterior distribution. Beginning with an initial guess for the
parameter vector γ0, we iterate on the following algorithm:
1. Draw a candidate vector γi from a distribution q(γi|γi−1).
2. Compute eH(γi,YT).
3. If pA = eH(γi,YT)
eH(γi−1,YT) ≥ 1, accept γi.
4. Else, accept γi with probability pA.
5. Set i ← i + 1 and return to Step 1.
Repeating these 5 steps and generating a long sequence of draws for γ yields a
sample of large size, hopefully drawn from the quasi posterior density p(γ,YT).25
Any moment of interest (means, standard deviations, quantiles, etc...) can be read-
ily computed. To evaluate the function eH(γ,YT) one needs to solve for the model
counterparts of the empirical series in YT. For a given γi in the sequence of simulated
draws, we obtain a model solution using the following steps:
1. We begin with guesses for θ, and ¯ z.26
2. Find the surplus functions SP, SR and ST by substituting and combining equa-
tions (19), (20), (21), (42), (44), and (47).
3. Update θ using equation (17). Using the functional form for the matching func-














IAEySP (y,z) + (1 − IA)EyST (y,z)
 
dG (z)(1 − φ)β
−βf G(A).
There are two important things to consider in this step. First, the initial guess of θ
isimportant. Notall valuesof θ converge. Second, duetothe degree ofnonlinear-
ity in our problem, we dampen the speed of updating θ by heavily weighting the
previous value. We set the updated value θNEW to be equal to λθOLD + (1 − λ)θ
where λ is 0.9 (updating is slow).
25We used 5,000 simulations and discarded the ﬁrst 1,000.
26We hope it is clear to the reader the implicit dependence of these variables on γi.
534. Update ¯ z by solving the two-equation system deﬁned by equations (55) and (56),
which solve for ¯ z and yP(¯ z).
5. Iterate on the previous two steps until the sequences of θ and ¯ z have converged.
6. Having obtained ¯ z and θ we can update the employment measures - both tempo-
rary and permanent - using the steady-state versions of equations (32) and (33).
These are given by:
nP =
 
u + nT 
αw (θ)(1− G(¯ z))
1−
  zmax
zmin [1− F(yP (z))]dG(z)
+
(1− αw (θ))














uαw (θ) G(¯ z)
1 − αw (θ) G(¯ z)
.
All integrals throughout are evaluated using quadrature. With values for θ, ¯ z, nT,
nP (and clearly u as a byproduct), one can compute wages and simulate histories of
workers to ﬁt regression equation (37). In addition, it is easy to compute other mo-
ments. In what follows we summarize how we compute the measures of turnover for
the different groups of workers.






nP + nT + (1− αw)
1
G(¯ z)
















• Job creation rate for permanent workers:
JCP = αw(1 − G(¯ z))
nT + u
nP + nT + (1 − αw)





54• Job destruction rate for temporary workers:
JDT = (1 − αw)
nT
nT + nP + αw(1 − G(¯ z))
nT
nP + nT
• Job destruction rate for temporary workers:
JCT = αwG(¯ z)
u
nP + nT
55